riscure

Bypassing Secure Boot using Fault Injection

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What are the contents of this talk?

Keywords – *fault injection, secure boot, bypasses, mitigations, practicalities, best practices, demo(s) ...*

Who are we?

Albert & Niek

- (Senior) Security Analysts at Riscure
- Security testing of different products and technologies

Riscure

- Services (Security Test Lab)
  - Hardware / Software / Crypto
  - Embedded systems / Smart cards
- Tools
  - Side channel analysis (passive)
  - Fault injection (active)
- Offices
  - Delft, The Netherlands / San Francisco, USA

*Combining **services** and **tools** for fun and profit!*

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Fault Injection – A definition...

”Introducing faults in a target to alter its intended behavior.”

```
...
if( key_is_correct ) <-- Glitch here!
{
  open_door();
}
else
{
  keep_door_closed();
}
...
```

How can we introduce these faults?

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How can we introduce these faults?

Fault injection techniques[1]

clock

voltage

e-magnetic

laser

Remark

- All techniques introduce faults externally

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Voltage fault injection

- Pull the voltage down at the right moment
- Not 'too soft'; Not 'too hard'



Source: http://www.limited-entropy.com/fault-injection-techniques/

Fault models

Faults that affect hardware

- Registers
- Buses

Faults that affect hardware that does software[2] [3] [4]

- Instruction corruption
- Data corruption

*The **true fault model** is **hard to predict** or prove!*

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Fault Models – ”Our” choice ...

When presented with code: ***instruction corruption****.*

Simple (MIPS)

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addi $t1, $t1, 8    00100001001010010000000000001000
addi $t1, $t1, 0    00100001001010010000000000000000
```

Complex (ARM)

```
ldr w1, [sp, #0x8]  10111001010000000001011111100001
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Remarks

- Limited control over which bit(s) will be corrupted
- May or may not be the true fault model
- Other fault model behavior covered

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

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

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

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

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

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

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[5] Public Key Infrastructure

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

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

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

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

Source: http://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-9306

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

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Why use a hardware attack?

”Logical issues exist in secure boot implementations!!?”

Bootloader vulnerabilities

- S5L8920 (iPhone)[6]
- Amlogic S905[7]

However

- Small code base results in a small logical attack surface
- Implementations without vulnerabililties likely exist

Other attack(s) must be used when not logically flawed!

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Why (not) fault injection on secure boot?

Cons

- Invasive
- Physical access
- Expensive

Pros

- No logical vulnerability required
- Typical targets not properly protected

*Especially **relevant** when **assets** are not available after boot!*

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Typical assets

Secure code

- Boot code (ROM[8])

Secrets

- Keys (for boot code decryption)

Secure hardware

- Cryptographic engines

[8] Read Only Memory

Typical assets

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Fault Injection – Intermezzo



Fault Injection – Tooling

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

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

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

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

Characterization – Test application[11]

```
asm volatile
    (
        ...
        "add r1, r1, #1;"
        "add r1, r1, #1;"
        < repeat >              <-- glitch here
        "add r1, r1, #1;"
        "add r1, r1, #1;"
        ...
    );
```

Remarks

- Full control over the target
- Increasing a counter using ADD instructions
- Send counter back using the serial interface

[11] Implemented as an U-Boot command

Characterization – Possible responses

Expected: 'too soft'

counter = 00010000

Mute: 'too hard'

counter =

Success: '$$$'

counter = 00009999

counter = 00010015

counter = 00008687

Remarks

- Glitching 'too hard' may damage the target permanently

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DEMO 1
PARAMETER SEARCH



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

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

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

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- Applicable to all secure boot implementations
- Bypass of authentication

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if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) != 0 )
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p += hashlen;

if( p != end )
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

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

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

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

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

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- Bypasses can happen on all levels
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Classic Bypass 02: Infinite loop

- What to do when the signature verification fails?
- Enter an infinite loop!

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/* glitch here */
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  /* do not boot up the image */
  while(1);

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Classic Bypass 02: Infinite loop

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

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

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

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

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

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Classic Bypass 03: Secure boot enable

- Secure boot often enabled/disabled based on OTP[13] bit
- No secure boot during development; secure boot in the field
- Typically just after the CPU comes out of reset



[13] One-Time-Programmable memory

Fault Injection – Mitigations

Hardware countermeasures [14] [15]

- Detect the glitch or fault

Software countermeasures [16]

- Lower the probability of a successful fault
- Do not address the root cause

*You can **lower the probability** but not rule it out!*

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Why?

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Compiler ’optimization’ – Double check

Example of a double check

```
unsigned int compare(char * input, int len)
{
    if(memcmp(password, input, len) == 0)        <-- 1st
    {
        if(memcmp(password, input, len) == 0)    <-- 2nd
        {
            return TRUE;
        }
    }
    return FALSE;
}
```

Compiler ’optimization’ – Double check

*Compiled **without** optimizations*



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

```
; int __fastcall compare(void *s2, size_t n)
EXPORT compare
compare
PUSH            {R3,LR}
MOV             R2, R1  ; n
MOV             R1, R0  ; s2
MOV             R0, #aPassword ; s1
BLX             memcmp
ADDS            R0, #0
IT NE
MOVNE           R0, #1
NEGS            R0, R0
POP             {R3,PC}
; End of function compare
```

Compiler ’optimizations’ – Best practices

- Your compiler is smarter than you
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Compiler 'optimization' – Pointer setup

*Example of a double check using '**volatile**'*

```
int checkSecureBoot( ){
    volatile int * otp_secure_boot = OTP_SECURE_BOOT;

    if( (*otp_secure_boot  >> 7) & 0x1 ){      <-- 1st
            return 0;
    }else{
        if( (*otp_secure_boot  >> 7) & 0x1 ){ <-- 2nd
            return 0;
        }else{
            return 1;
        }
    }
}
```

Compiler ’optimization’ – Pointer setup

Compiled with optimizations

```
checkSecureBoot
MOV             R3, #0x20204000
LDR             R2, [R3] ; Load from pointer
LSLS            R2, R2, #0x18
ITTTE PL
LDRPL           R0, [R3] ; Second load from pointer
UBFXPL.W        R0, R0, #7, #1
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

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Those were the classics and their mitigations ..

... the attack surface is larger![17]

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- Introducing logical vulnerabilities using fault injection
  - Build your own buffer overflow!
- Easy approach: change *memcpy* the size argument

Before corruption

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memcpy(dst, src, 0x1000);
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After corruption

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memcpy(dst, src, 0xCEE5);
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Remark

- Works when dedicated hardware is used (e.g. DMA[18] engines)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Combined attack - Controlling PC on ARM[20]

- Exploits an ARM32 characteristic
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Multi-word copy

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LDMIA r1!, {r3 - r10}
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Controlling PC using LDMIA

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LDMIA r1!,{r3-r10}    1110100010110001000001111111000
LDMIA r1!,{r3-r10,PC} 1110100010110001100001111111000
```

- Variations possible on other architectures; code dependent

[19] Program Counter

[20] Controlling PC on ARM using Fault Injection – Timmers et al., 2016

Combined attack - Controlling PC on ARM[20]

- Exploits an ARM32 characteristic
- PC[19] register is directly accessible by most instructions

Multi-word copy

```
LDMIA r1!, {r3 - r10}
STMIA r0!, {r3 - r10}
```

Controlling PC using LDMIA

```
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LDMIA r1!,{r3-r10,PC}  11101000101100011000011111111000
```

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Combined attack - Controlling PC on ARM



Remark

- Targetting the copy function arguments

Combined attack - Controlling PC on ARM



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

Remark

- Targetting the copy function arguments

Combined attacks - Wild jungle jump[21]

- Start glitching while/after loading the image but before decryption
- Lots of ’magic’ pointers around, which point close to the code
- Get them from: stack, register, memory
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[21] Proving the wild jungle jump – Gratchoff, 2015

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

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

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

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

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Combined attack(s) – Summary

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Secure Boot – Demo Design



Remark

- Stage 2 is invalided by changing the printed string
- Stage 1 enters an infinite loop when the signature is invalid

Secure Boot – Demo Design



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

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When to glitch?

- Not possible to use a signal originating from target
- Only reference point is power-on reset moment
- Use side-channels to obtain more information
- Compare behavior between valid image and an invalid image

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Boot profiling – Reset

Valid image



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

Remark

- No difference between a valid and invalid image
- Attack window spreads across the entire trace (~400 ms)

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

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

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

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

Remark

- No difference between a valid and invalid image
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Boot profiling – Flash activity

Valid image



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

Remarks

- Flash activity 3 not present for the invalid image
- Attack window between flash activity 2 and 3 (~10 ms)

Boot profiling – Flash activity

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

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

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

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

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

Remark

- Measuring electromagnetic emissions using a probe[22]

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

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

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

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- Power profile at black arrow is flat: **infinite loop**

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Remark

- Jitter during boot prevents effective timing (~150 µs)

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

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

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How to minimize jitter during boot?

- Power-on reset is too early
- Use a signal close to the ’glitch moment’

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

Remark

- Using flash activity 2 as a trigger to minimize jitter

How to minimize jitter during boot?

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

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Glitch Timing – Power consumption



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

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BYPASSING SECURE BOOT



Glitch parameter search

- Fixed the glitch delay to 300 ms
- Fixed the glitch voltage to -2 V
- Randomize the glitch length

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

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

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

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

Secure Boot – Manufacturer Best practices

Minimize attack surface

- Authenticate all code and data
- Limit functionality in ROM code
- Disable memory when not required

Lower the probability

- Implement fault injection countermeasures
- Implement software exploitation mitigations

*Robustness can only be determined using **testing**!*

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